Far Outliers

Portuguese Studies Review, vol. 11, no. 1 is entirely devoted to East Timor, past and present. It sounds as if it could be interesting. The table of contents follows.

David Webster, University of British Columbia

“Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor, 1975-1999.” Pp. 1-28

Estêvão Cabral, Lancaster University, UK

“Portugal and East Timor: From a Politics of Ambivalence to a Late Awakening.” Pp. 29-47

Jeffery Klaehn, Wilfrid Laurier University

“Canadian Complicity in the East Timor Near-Genocide: A Case Study in the Sociology of Human Rights.” Pp. 49-65.

Peter Eglin, Wilfrid Laurier University

“East Timor, The Globe and Mail and Propaganda: The 1990s–Saving Indonesia from East Timor with ‘Maoist Shields’ and ‘Tragic Destiny’.” Pp. 67-84.

Robert Everton and James Winter, University of Windsor

“Media Coverage of an Imminent Bloodbath in East Timor: What Was Known, and When?” Pp. 85-101.

David Wurfel, Professor Emeritus, University of Windsor

“Constitution for a New State: Political Context and Possible Problems in East Timor.” Pp. 103-121.

Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, University of Sydney and University of Wollongong

“Social Institutions in East Timor: Following in the Undemocratic Footsteps of the West.” Pp. 123-136.

Michael Leach, Deakin University

” ‘Privileged Ties’: Young People Debating Language, Heritage and National Identity in East Timor.” Pp. 137-150.

Helder da Costa, Asia 2000 Foundation of New Zealand

“Future Economic Direction of Timor-Leste.” Pp. 151-167.

Tim Anderson, University of Sydney

“Self-determination after Independence: East Timor and the World Bank.” Pp. 169-185.

Geoffrey Gunn, Nagasaki University

“Rebuilding Agriculture in Post Conflict Timor-Leste: A Critique of the World Bank Role.” Pp. 187-205.

Robert Go of the Straits Times reports on two different strategies for religious minorities to participate in the Indonesian elections:

By establishing their own political party:

JAKARTA – In Muslim-dominated Indonesia, one party stands out – the Prosperous Peace party (PDS), the only party representing the Protestant and Catholic minorities.

Established in 2001, it is a fairly new entrant to the political scene. It is also the only one – of seven – parties to pass the selection criteria of the General Election Commission (KPU).

PDS members are mostly professionals drawn from small prayer groups which united gradually over time.

They spell hope for the Christian minorities, accounting for about 10-11 per cent of the population, whose voices did not find representation during the Suharto era.

PDS hopes this will translate to votes.

Among those who are optimistic is Mr Toga Sianturi, who is contesting a seat in North Sumatra‘s parliament.

‘God willing, I will be successful,’ he said.

‘There are many Christians in this province, and I think they will support the party.’

Mr Sianturi’s reason for hope is that around 40 per cent of North Sumatrans are Christians.

But political observers believe the party faces an uphill struggle.

Church and community leaders here said Christians are loyal to Golkar and President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-P.

Those two nationalist and secular parties together took nearly 70 per cent of the vote in the 1999 general election.

Analyst Henry Sitorus argued that even if Christian voters abandon the two big parties, they will likely go for smaller newcomers with nationalist ideologies.

Another analyst, Dr S.B. Simanjuntak, said Christians realise they belong to a minority, so they will be careful about stirring up trouble by voting along religious lines.

Or by supporting the major political parties:

SEMATANG SIANTAR (North Sumatra) – The candidate was Protestant, but the final prayer closing the political rally was Islamic.

Ethnic Chinese faces dotted the 500-strong crowd in Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra’s second largest city.

A vocal group of women wearing party-sponsored tee shirts with the slogan “Fight injustice against women, we demand equality” were standing visibly up front.

Though the key fight in this year’s elections is still between Golkar and President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a new game is being played in the background.

Analysts and its proponents describe it as the politics of inclusion – where political parties that at one time pitched solely for Muslim votes are now looking at non-traditional voters as well – to maintain their political grip.

Right now, the best practitioner of the new politics appears to be the party of former president Abdurrahman Wahid – the National Awakening Party (PKB).

Critics argue that in a country that is just waking up from more than three decades of one-party rule and a strict adherence to one political ideology, this new approach might well become critical, and very attractive, to voters in the future.

In 1999, PKB’s main image was that of a Muslim-based party.

Its strongest association was to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s biggest Islamic organisation that the grandfather of Gus Dur, as Mr Abdurrahman is popularly known here, started, and which his family dominated.

But since then, the party has started to shed that image and PKB has made progress in forging links with the ethnic minorities.

Mr Bara Hasibuan, a Christian who is actively campaigning for the PKB and is an election candidate, is a poster boy for the new brand of politicking.

“It’s about time we address the equality issue,” he said.

“We can’t move ahead as long as ethnic and religious fault lines separate the people.”

He has received endorsements from church groups, Islamic boarding schools and ethnic-Chinese businessmen.

And such has been his appeal that some of those subjected to discrimination due to their links to the PKI, the communist party that was blamed for a failed coup d’etat in 1965, have also responded to the messages pitched by Mr Hasibuan and the PKB.

Mr Abdurrahman’s party is not the only one to forge new alliances with minority groups.

Dr Amien Rais’ National Mandate Party (PAN) has positioned itself the same way.

Golkar and PDI-P, too, are stressing their secular-nationalist credentials.

But PKB seems to have gone far to be the only party with concrete examples of inclusion to tout.

During his presidency from late 1999 to July 2001, Gus Dur laid the framework for this when he made the Chinese New Year a national holiday and legalised the use of Chinese writing.

The PKB has also argued staunchly against the inclusion of syariah Islamic principles in Indonesian laws.

Said ethnic Chinese businessman Bambang Sungkono, who is also a treasurer of PKB’s national leadership board: “If you look at the different parties, the PKB is the only one that has done anything on these issues.

“If Christians, ethnic Chinese and other minority groups are looking for the real inclusive attitude, they don’t have to go further than Gus Dur and PKB.”

Democracy is an awfully messy way to run a country, but both Malaysia and Indonesia give grounds for hope of a continuing democratic transformation that could serve as models for other regions.

Hugh White, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, opines about the upcoming Indonesian elections in the Melbourne Age:

Next Monday, 147 million Indonesians go to the polls to elect Indonesia’s Parliament. It is the first step in a months-long process that will lead to the elections for the president later in the year. So far the campaign has been peaceful.

The fact that this is all happening at all is a kind of miracle. Indonesia’s experiment with democracy is about to pass a critical milestone. It has survived a full five-year electoral cycle since the first truly democratic election in 1999.

The five years since then have been mixed for Indonesia. The economy has staged at least a temporary recovery, and the constitution has survived the removal of the former president, Abdurrahman Wahid (“Gus Dur”), and his replacement by his deputy, Megawati Soekarnoputri.

The military has stayed on the sidelines, and important constitutional reforms were made to provide for the direct election of the president.

But at the same time, deeper reforms to Indonesia’s institutions needed to foster long-term economic development have been shelved. Apathy and cynicism about the value of democracy has grown, and with it a certain nostalgia for the authoritarian but effective ways of president Soeharto.

The open market in political ideas provided by democracy has not thrown up any new or compelling ideas for Indonesia’s future direction.

So on Monday, Indonesia’s voters will face a familiar line-up. The two big parties between them are expected to win more than half the vote. Last time Megawati’s party, PDI-P, won 34 per cent and Golkar, which was Soeharto’s political machine, won 22 per cent. This time the pundits expect their positions to be reversed, as Megawati suffers the political consequences of an ineffectual and disappointing incumbency.

Perhaps most striking, Indonesia’s smaller Islamic-based parties seem to have made little progress over the past five years. Islam appeared to have been making bigger inroads into Indonesia’s political life during the 1990s and many had expected that the polarisation between Islam and the West since September 11 would have amplified that trend, pushing a more stridently Islamic strain politics to the fore.

Instead, the polling suggests the Islamic vote will stagnate – which, if true, will reinforce the result of Malaysia’s recent elections in which the strongly Islamist party PAS was mauled.

For more on Malaysia’s recent elections, see Head Heeb and below.

Brendan I. Koerner reports in the 26 March 2004 edition of Slate:

How Did Suharto Steal $35 Billion? – Cronyism 101

Mohamed Suharto has received a dubious honor from Transparency International, which named the former Indonesian president the most corrupt world leader of the past 20 years. With his family’s takings estimated at between $15 billion and $35 billion, Suharto topped such notorious kleptocrats as Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines ($5 billion to $10 billion) and Nigeria’s Sani Abacha ($2 billion to $5 billion). How did the longtime Indonesian strongman amass his wealth?

Sssh! I’m working with Madame Abacha (and the Bank of Equatorial Guinea) to recapture a big percentage of her husband’s ill-gotten wealth. Unfortunately, Ibu Tien Suharto (“Madame Ten Percent“) failed to outlive her husband.

Through a system that his political opponents called KKN, the Indonesian acronym for “corruption, collusion, nepotism” [korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme]. Suharto handed control of state-run monopolies to family members and friends, who in turn kicked back millions in tribute payments. Those payments were usually cloaked as charitable donations to the dozens of foundations overseen by Suharto. Known as yayasans, these organizations were supposed to assist with the constructions of rural schools and hospitals but instead functioned as Suharto’s personal piggy banks. Doling out millions to one of the foundations was simply part of the cost of doing business in Indonesia during much of Suharto’s 32-year reign. Financial institutions were ordered to contribute a portion of their annual profits to a yayasan, for example, and wealthy Indonesians were expected to “tithe” a certain percentage of their salaries.

CANBERRA (AP): Australia will send a delegation of lawmakers to monitor next week’s elections in Indonesia, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said on Tuesday….

“Australia has committed up to A$15 million ($US11 million) to support the Indonesian government in running this election,” Downer said.

Indonesians go to the polls on April 5 to elect a 550-seat legislature….

With nearly 17,000 islands to cover, Indonesian election officials have had to transport ballot papers to remote areas by air force planes, boat, and in some cases, donkeys.