CANBERRA (AP): Australia will send a delegation of lawmakers to monitor next week’s elections in Indonesia, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said on Tuesday….
“Australia has committed up to A$15 million ($US11 million) to support the Indonesian government in running this election,” Downer said.
Indonesians go to the polls on April 5 to elect a 550-seat legislature….
With nearly 17,000 islands to cover, Indonesian election officials have had to transport ballot papers to remote areas by air force planes, boat, and in some cases, donkeys.
Category Archives: Southeast Asia
Australians to Help Monitor Indonesian Elections
Filed under Indonesia
‘The English Are a Very Strange Tribe’
In 1936 another white man turned up in Phekhon, in the company of some Indians from Loikaw. He invited two of the grandmothers and some of their friends from the village who wore neck-rings, along with their husbands, to come to England. They had no idea what the purpose of the invitation was, and the Italian priest was vehemently against their going away. Nevertheless, they were all excited and eager for the journey. They were to be taken around Europe by a circus called Bertram Mills and exhibited as freaks. Since we did not have the concept of a ‘freak’, and since, anyway, we took our tradition of women wearing the rings for granted, they and their relatives were unlikely to be offended by the idea.
They were flown to Rangoon from Loikaw, and shipped to France to be shown to the French public as a test of their popularity before they eventually arrived in England. Not long before the Second World War broke out they returned to Phekhon, richer with English money. They showed us photographs of places they had visited, but could never remember the names….
The grandmothers told me that one of the photographs was taken in front of the English chief’s house, in a big village called London. They said that in this big village they didn’t have to climb the stairs, but the stairs carried them up and down. They liked the moving stairs, because they hated walking in the shoes that had been provided for them – since all their lives they had gone barefoot.
They suffered from the cold of England. Nor did they understand what spirits the English were appeasing in always having to drink tea at a certain time, although they loved the cakes that went with this ceremony. ‘The English are a very strange tribe,’ said Grandma Mu Tha. ‘They paid money just to look at us – they paid us for not working. They are very rich, but they cannot afford to drink rice-wine. Their trees are unable to grow leaves during the rainy season. They say, “Hello,” “How are you” and “Goodbye” all the time to one another. They never ask, “Have you eaten your meal?” or “When will you take your bath?” when they see you.’ Grandma Mu Tha gave up trying to account for these strange habits, which afforded her great amusement. If we had had the notion of ‘freaks’, I suppose she would have put the whole English race into that category.
SOURCE: From the Land of Green Ghosts: A Burmese Odyssey, by Pascal Khoo Thwe (HarperCollins, 2002), pp. 28-29
Etymologically, Myanmar = Burma
In 1989, Burma‘s military government changed the name of the country to Myanmar. The reason, it said, was that the British colonial power had named it ‘Burma’ after the main ethnic group in the country, the Burmese, who inhabit the central plains. ‘Myanmar’, it was argued, included the Burmese and all other ‘ethnic races’, including the Shan, the Karen, the Mon, the Kachin and more than 100 other nationalities. This is, however, historically and linguistically highly dubious. The once-British colony has always been called Burma in English and bama or myanma in Burmese. [The Japanese designation biruma would thus appear to have come from the English spelling.]
The best explanation of the difference between bama and myanma is to be found in the Hobson-Jobson Dictionary, which remains a very useful source of information. ‘The name [Burma] is taken from Mran-ma, the national name of the Burmese people, which they themselves generally pronounce Bam-ma, unless speaking formally and emphatically.’
Both names have been used interchangeably throughout history, with Burma being more colloquial and Myanmar more formal. Burma and Myanmar (and Burmese and Myanmar) mean exactly the same thing, and it is hard to argue that the term ‘Myanmar’ would include any more people within the present union than the name ‘Burma’.
There is no term in the language that includes both the Burmans and the minority peoples, since no country with the borders of present-day Burma existed before the arrival of the British in the nineteenth century. Burma, with its present boundaries, is a colonial creation rife with internal contractions and divisions.
SOURCE: “Myanmar/Burma,” by Bertil Lintner, in Ethnicity in Asia, ed. by Colin Mackerras (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 174
Burma: Broken Heaven, Broken Earth
Canadian essayist, novelist, and poet Karen Connelly wrote about Burma in the Asia Observer:
There is only one other person staying at the hotel above the river. She is an artist from Spain. On the evening before her departure, we dine together. She has a pressing need to explain herself.
“I’m an idealist like you. I really am. I grew up in Spain, you know. I remember what it was like, during Franco’s time. My parents were always telling me not to get involved in the politics, it was very dangerous. Really, I am an idealist, and I think it’s terrible that these people are so badly off.”
“I don’t think badly off really explains it. They are poverty-stricken, malnourished. And oppressed. Hungry for many things.”
“Do you really think they are? Really? Is it really possible to be hungry in the tropics? There is so much fruit everywhere. When I was in the north, there were two children sitting outside my restaurant with empty bowls, so of course I gave them some of my food. But someone else would have fed them if I hadn’t. They wouldn’t have gone to bed hungry.”
I swallow a sip of my water, bottled water.
She continues, “A doctor I met up there said that he has never seen the infant mortality rate so high. I agree, that is really awful. But in a way, it’s a natural form of birth control.”
I want to ask this elegant, beautiful woman if she is on the pill. She was educated at one of the most expensive art schools in London. Has she ever had a baby, and watched her baby die, slowly, of diarrhoea? Dysentery? Malaria? Food poisoning? Those are the common killers of babies born in Burma, ailments often complicated by malnutrition. I finish my glass of water. The food has come but my appetite has left me.
“And they are always smiling! I really don’t believe they’re so miserable. They’re always so happy.”
Surely she will hear the exasperation in my voice. “But that’s part of being Buddhist. Many people, especially the poor, accept the conditions of their lives, and they revel in whatever life is around them. The Burmese are a deeply hospitable people, too: that’s why smile at us.”
“They look so happy. There seemed to be a lot of people with bad eye diseases in the north, and even they laughed a lot.”
Awkward pause. What can I say?
“I really am idealist, but if democracy came all at once to Burma, this country would disintegrate! It can’t come too quickly.”
“But the people of Burma already voted in a democratic government. There were elections in 1990. The NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, won by a landslide. The military refused to hand over power.” Surely she must know these little details from her guidebook.
“Well, voting for freedom is one thing, but living with it is another. If it comes too quickly, Myanmar will disintegrate!”
How can she not see? She is a painter; her vocation is in her eyes. “But the country already is disintegrating. Nothing works here. The currency is a farce, corruption is rife, the military makes deals with druglords, and the overwhelming majority of people cannot afford to live on what they make because inflation is so high. Even the electricity doesn’t work. People die after operations because the hospitals cannot afford proper sterilization equipment!”
She looks at me squarely, condescendingly. “Journalists exaggerate the situation.”
“I haven’t been talking to journalists. I’ve been talking to Burmese people. Students, doctors, artists, market women.”
But the doubt remains plain on her face, tightening her lips. “I know how bad it is. But if democracy comes too quickly …” Her voice trails off. She begins to eat. I move my food around with a fork.
Strange, the fork. Lately I’ve been eating Burmese-style, with my hands. There is something intensely pleasurable about touching the food one puts in one’s mouth. Messy, but fun.
The Spanish artist looks up from her curried chicken with an alarming intensity and asks, “What are you trying to do for the Burmese people?”
This question takes me by surprise. I think for a moment, but can’t decide how to reply. I feel acute embarrassment. Flustered, I say, “Nothing.”
“But you must be trying to do something.”
I raise my eyebrows, searching. “Um. No. I’m not.”
“Why did you come here then? You said you would never come here only as a tourist, so what are you doing here then, if not trying to accomplish something?”
“I’m just talking and listening.”
“But aren’t you trying to accomplish the freedom of these people?”
I laugh out loud; her statement is so lofty. I am embarrassed and uncomfortable that we are sitting at this table in Burma, talking about the Burmese, while the waiters stand at the dining room doors like sleepy sentinels. They might understand everything we’re saying. Or nothing, which is worse. I want to apologize to them. I want to flee. “I don’t pretend anything like that. It’s too presumptuous. It sounds silly. Only they can accomplish their own freedom. I am … hanging around.”
“But you’ve been going on about how terrible the government is here, and how much all these people you’ve met have suffered, and how powerful this place is for you. Don’t you want to do anything? You must be trying to do something. Why don’t you just say it?”
“I just want to write about what I see here. That’s all. That will do whatever it can do. All things considered, that will be very little.”
Now it is her turn to sip water. Oh, let the meal be done, let this be over. In other circumstances–in a gallery in Madrid, for example, drinking sangria in a bar in Segovia, I know I would like her. It is foolish as well as fraudulent for me to stand on the moral high ground, though the natural birth control comment was appalling. But we all say appalling things sometimes. It’s the nature of being white, or powerful, or simply human. I have Gorky to temper me: By then I could see that all people are more or less guilty before the god of absolute truth, and that no one is as guilty before mankind as the self-righteous. The sharpening edge of defensiveness in her voice comes from a guilt which has nothing to do with me. I want to say, “It’s unnecessary, please don’t feel that way,” but I just listen to what she says next with a small, pained smile on my face.
“I really feel that I have done a lot for them. I have tried to talk and smile as much as possible. You know, I’ve tried to let them know that foreigners are not threatening, not awful people. And it’s absolute hell up in the north where there are no other tourists. The locals won’t leave you alone for a second. It’s hard work, to be up there, wandering around, trying to get to places they won’t let you get to, and all the people are mobbed around you, and there’s no other white people. I kept calm the whole time, never lost my temper, always just smiled as much as possible.”
I smile myself. The news is coming on. Out of respect, or perhaps out of curiosity to catch more fragments of our conversation, one of the dining room attendants turns down the volume. Conversation wanes in the presence of the silent news; we turn, along with the young Burmese waiters, to watch images of a fine mango crop on screen, box after box of the small, sweet spheres lined up and glowing like orange gems. Surely it is impossible to be hungry in the land of a million mangoes. Now come the obligatory scenes of a military leader inspecting a new factory. Then a whole troop of soldiers marching on some road somewhere in the jungle. Shot after shot of automatic weapons, belts heavy with ammunition. They are very serious, very thin young men, every jaw bone a study in angles, clenched muscle. The Spanish woman turns away from the television and talks more about the difficulties of being a tourist. I nod slowly, suddenly tired. White-shirted waiters come, take away our plates. With great concern, the younger one asks, in Burmese, why I have eaten so little. “I am not hungry.” He is aghast, despite my attempts to reassure him. When the table is cleared and the poor waiter becalmed, the Spanish artist and the Canadian writer stand up. “Perhaps we will meet again some day in Madrid.” Perhaps. We exchange Buenas noches.
Oddly enough, as I get ready for bed, I think about the Basque country, Euskadi: northern Spain, but not Spain exactly. And so very far from Burma, another world, another lifetime. But every country shares history, just as every human being does. If I know one thing, it is the ultimate meaninglessness of borders. A decade ago, I lived with a woman, also a painter, who was still a child when the tyrant Franco was pronounced dead. As soon as this news came, the children of Euskadi were turned loose from school. The most vivid memory of Maru’s childhood was made that day, when she ran through the village streets with her classmates, crying joy.
Malaysia’s Islamic Party Loses Ground in Elections
Jane Perlez reports in the New York Times:
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, March 21 — The major Islamic party in Malaysia lost significant ground in parliamentary and state elections here today as the governing coalition of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi coasted to victory.
The Islamic party, Parti Islam SeMalaysia, lost the state legislatures in the oil rich northern state of Terengganu and in the neighboring state of Kalantan. In a humiliating loss, the leader of the party, Ulama Hadi Awang, lost his federal parliamentary seat.
The fortunes of the Islamic party, which won control of the Terengganu state legislature four years ago, were being closely watched as a barometer of militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, holds parliamentary elections early next month.
Since taking control in Terengganu, the Islamic party, popularly known as PAS, has imposed religious laws, including bans on alcohol and gambling.
“If this election says one thing it says that Malaysia is rejecting the Islamization policies of PAS,” said Bridget Welsh, assistant professor of Southeast Asia studies at John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, who is visiting here. “PAS has been decimated.”
Mr. Abdullah, 64, who inherited the prime minister’s job in November from the longstanding incumbent, Mahathir Mohamad, ran on an anti-corruption platform. He presented a more benign tone than his brittle predecessor, and as a descendant of Muslim scholars, the new prime minister appealed to voters who support a moderate version of Islam.
That approach stymied the efforts of the Parti Islam SeMalaysia to build on its gains in the Malay heartland, in the northern part of the country.
Among the lessons to be drawn here, it seems to me, is that the best way to keep any one religious faction from dominating government is to clean up government while also allowing all religious groups to participate in the political process. Targeting particular (nonviolent) religious groups–whether the Islamic Party in Turkey, the Falun Gong in China, or the Christian Coalition in the U.S.– as in some sense “enemies of the state” seems only to backfire when the governing party itself loses credibility.
UPDATE: Head Heeb has more.
"It often takes a lack of education to be able to express things clearly"
Ian Buruma was visiting the island of Hainan in China in May 1998 when news arrived that General Suharto had been forced to step down as leader of Indonesia, partly as a result of massive student demonstrations.
“This is very important news for all Asian people,” said the keen young reporter for a local paper in Hainan. He was greatly excited, unusual in China when it comes to foreign news. We were sitting at the editorial office of a literary magazine. Most of the editors were there, as were some of the main writers. A young secretary passed around paper plates containing bananas and grapes. I was asked for my “foreign” view.
I could only repeat what I had read in the papers in Hong Kong. I said the Indonesian students had been inspired by the example of Tiananmen. This was received with nervous looks and polite laughter. One or two people scraped the floor with their feet. What did I think of the possibility of democratic change in China? It was not a question I relished, for I did not like to hold forth, in my imperfect Chinese, to people who knew the problems of their country better than I ever would. Still, I had to say something. So I said I saw no reason why Chinese could not handle a democracy if the Koreans, the Filipinos, the Taiwanese, the Japanese, and now, one hoped, the Indonesians could.
The usual discussion–usual among Chinese intellectuals, that is–about the peculiarities of Chinese culture ensued. It would take a long time for democracy to develop in China. China was too big. China was too poor. China was too complicated. Chinese history was too long. Chinese people needed to be more educated. They had little idea of democratic rights. If democracy came too suddenly, there might be chaos. And so on. The keen young reporter then asked me whether I could comment on a particularly “sensitive topic.” What about June 4, 1989, the Beijing Massacre? But one of the editors, the most senior person in the room, swiftly intervened, pointing out that I was a “distinguished foreign guest,” who had traveled far, so perhaps I could offer them some insights into the wider world outside China.
Later that same day, I went out on my own for a snack. Opposite my hotel was a half-finished concrete shell of a building. Much of Haikou, the main city of Hainan, was like that. The building boom of the early 1990s had come to a sudden halt, victim of the Asian financial crisis. Parts of Haikou looked as though they had been bombed. A kitchen had been improvised in one of the rooms of the half-finished building. Next door a jerry-built “beauty parlor” was a front for a brothel. A young man, his shirtless back shiny with sweat, was tossing noodles about in a large pot. After some diffidence, he wiped his hands on his trousers and came over for a chat. We were joined by two of his friends and a girl in a filmy evening gown, who worked at another “beauty parlor.” They stared at me and said nothing.
The cook had come down from a village in Sichuan with his sister, who was helping him run the food stall. But he was in debt to the businessman who paid his wages. That was the trouble with the economic reforms, he said. The rich bosses now controlled everything. I nodded, and slowly ate my noodles with garlic and squid. The chef then shifted in his seat and emptied his nose, by first blocking one nostril and snorting in a short, sharp burst, then repeating the procedure with the other nostril. His manners were far from elegant. But he was no fool. “You know,” he suddenly said, “in your country the individual has the right to control his own life. Not here in China. Everything is controlled from above. The Communist Party has complete power. That is why we have no rights here.”
The intellectuals at the literary magazine might well have shared the cook’s view. In fact, some almost certainly did. But one of the oddities in contemporary China is that it often takes a lack of education to be able to express things clearly. Or, to put it differently, it is those who live near the bottom of society who feel the lack of individual rights most keenly. That is why they generally get to the point more quickly.
SOURCE: Bad Elements: Chinese Rebels from Los Angeles to Beijing, by Ian Buruma (Vintage, 2001), pp. 232-233
Initiatives by Moderate Muslims in Indonesia
The East-West Wire of Honolulu’s East-West Center ran the following story last week while I was away.
MODERATE MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA USE IRAQ WAR PROTESTS, CIVIC EDUCATION TO UNDERCUT SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS
HONOLULU (March 10) — Muslim moderates in Indonesia prevented Islamic extremists from using the Iraq war to gain support by focusing anti-war rallies on peace, a leading U.S. scholar of Islam and civil society said Tuesday at an East-West Center program. They have also helped contain extremism by initiating civic education in Muslim universities.
By organizing mass anti-war rallies like those seen in the United States in the 1960s, moderates “seized the (Iraq) issue from the extremists,” said Robert Hefner, an anthology professor and associate director of Boston University’s Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs. “Iraq, to my astonishment, had little impact. The moderates reasserted themselves.”
Hefner just returned from Indonesia, where he examined communications between the United States and Islamic communities. Since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States and the Bali bombing, moderate Muslims have mobilized radio programming and other networks to help Indonesians understand issues that might be used by extremists and terrorists to build support, he said.
“The moderate Muslims know there is a crisis, a struggle for hearts and souls, and they are looking for political and cultural tools to combat extremism,” he said.
After the Suharto regime collapsed in 1998, the moderates initiated the largest civic education program in Asia and in all the Muslim world. The course is required at all Muslim universities, reaching 18 percent of the country’s university students, and is funded by the United States through the Asia Foundation and by other international governments and agencies. Muslim educators have also started introducing the course into the upper grades at pesantren, Indonesia’s religious schools.
The course, using textbooks written at Muslim universities, looks at how democracy, plurality and human rights are compatible and vital components of Islam. Classes have triggered much student interest, Hefner said.
Hefner noted that Indonesians take great interest in the political process — 93 percent of voters cast ballots in the 1999 elections and a high turnout is expected at this year’s elections as well.
Such efforts are indeed praiseworthy, but this report, like so many purely academic reports, seems utterly to ignore how ineffective the moderates were in preventing the horrendous outbreaks of violence throughout the country–from Aceh to Maluku to East Timor to West Papua–much of it stoked by the brutal Indonesian military and inflamed by well-armed, hardcore extremists from the Laskar Jihad, which reached a crescendo in 1999-2000, well before the Iraq invasion, before 11 September 2001, and even before the U.S. presidential election in 2000.
The Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) needs all the support we can give it.
Filed under Indonesia
A Chronology of West New Guinea (West Papua) since 1945
The conflict between the Dutch and the Indonesions over the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea followed the Indonesian revolution of 1945-9. The Round Table Conference Agreement (1949) had left that part of the former Netherlands East Indies under Dutch occupation, as a concession to Netherlands nationalist feeling; in the succeeding decade the Netherlands devoted considerable attention to developing the area as an example of constructive colonial effort. The Indonesions, however, considered ‘West Irian’ an essential part of their state, and as the nationalist temper rose during the 1950s increasing emphasis was placed on forcing its concession.
In 1957 Dutch residents were expelled from Indonesia and the Netherlands-owned property was nationalized, and in 1961 military harassment of the colony began. The US entered the dispute as a mediator favourable to the Indonesion side, as a result partly to this, and partly of pressure by Dutch businessmen anxious to restore relations with Indonesia, the Netherlands agreed in August 1962 to relinquish control. After interim UN rule, West Irian was handed over to the Indonesians in May 1963, on the understanding that in 1969 the Irianese would be allowed to chose whether they wished to continue under Indonesian rule. Mismanagement, economic stringency, and the contempt with which Indonesians tended to regard the local Papuan population led to a series of uprisings under both Sukarno and Suharto. However, all non-Papuan parties to the dispute were agreed that the territory should remain in Indonesian hands, no international objections were raised when the 1969 ‘act of free choice’ was made a purely symbolic one.
1. The West New Guinea question resulted from the demands during the 1920s and 1930s of ultra colonial Dutch groupings to have the area declared as a separate Netherlands crown colony.
2. After the outbreak of the Indonesian revolution in 1945 it were especially the Eurasian group–now suffering Republican attacks and seeing their earlier superior social status being demolished–supported by conservative politicians again agitated for West New Guinea to be put aside as their new fatherland under the protection of the Dutch crown.
3. On 20 December 1946 the Netherlands parliament passed an amended Dutch-Indonesian agreement (Linggajati) in which West New Guinea was accorded a special political status. This clause was again included in the Renville agreement of 17 January 1948.
4. In order to avert for the West New Guinea question to cause the derailment of the Round Table negotiations, as a compromise the matter was shelved to further negotiations in 1950, and on 27 December 1949 the Netherlands transferred its sovereignty to Republic of United States of Indonesia.
5. During 1950 Dutch-Indonesian relations gradually deteriorated causing various meetings about West New Guinea to fail; and on 17 March 1951 the Dutch government decided to ‘freeze’ the issue.
6. After the failure of the Eurasian experiment the Netherlands government in 1951 directed its attention to the socio-economic development of the Papuan population and to guide Papuan nationalism towards to achievement of self government and finally independence.
7. Indonesia put the question to the United Nations, but during 10 December 1954 UN Assembly meeting failed to achieve the two-third quorum.
8. By 1956 the Dutch position regarding West New Guinea had grown irrevocably stubborn causing parliament to have the area enshrined in the constitution as part of the Netherlands kingdom.
9. By 1960 it is clear that the vast majority of Papuan leaders rejected to join the Indonesian Republic and instead called for the establishment of an independent Papuan state. A this time, however, the eventuality of this had become rather dim as the Netherlands had been unable to secure military support from the USA and Australia in the case of a threatened full-fledged Indonesian invasion.
10. Originally Australia was absolutely opposed to an Indonesian take over of West New Guinea. For example in March 1947 Dr. Burton, the head the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, made a strong plea in the Netherlands embassy in Canberra for West New Guinea to be kept out of Indonesian hands. Similarly the succeeding Menzies government in February 1950 emphasised that West New Guinea was of same vital strategic interest to Australia as Papua-New Guinea.
11. Australian attempts to secure American agreement of military help in the view of war with Indonesia received the same vague responses as the Dutch have been given in Washington. As a result in January 1959 Prime Minister Menzies told Dutch ambassador Lovink that it was impossible for Australia to ally itself militarily with the Netherlands.
12. The USA only grudgingly tolerated continued Dutch control of West New Guinea. Washington took a neutral stand in Dutch-Indonesian dispute and never openly supported the Dutch position. American policy was solely concentrated on keeping Indonesia out of Communist hands and showed no interest in the human rights of the Papuan people. So in 1961 President Kennedy abandoned the American policy of ‘neutrality’ regarding West New Guinea forcing in 1963 the Netherlands to hand over the territory to Indonesia via an United Nations commission. In Washington the right of Papuans of self-determination had ended up in the wastepaper basket.
13. April 1962 Indonesians launch Operation Mandala under command of Benny Murdani and General Suharto. 1419 commandos dropped into West Papua. Most captured or killed.
14. Increasing US support for Indonesian position after US $450 million low-interest loan in 1960 to Indonesia from USSR. Indonesians playing US and USSR off against each other.
15. New York Agreement between Indonesia and Dutch (no Papuan representation) allows for United Nations Temporary Executive Authority to administer WNG from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963. Control then to go to Indonesia with change of sovereignty confirmed by ill-defined ‘Act of Free Choice’ within five years.
16. ‘Act of Free Choice‘ carried out in 1969 with 1025 hand picked and savagely coerced representatives voting unanimously for incorporation. Outcome accepted by UN as both Holland and Indonesia agree to process.
17. Large-scale uprisings throughout country against Indonesian rule. Put down by Indonesian military although widespread protests continue, for instance in Manokwari in the mid-1960s; Baliem Valley in mid-1970s and around Jayapura and border area in mid-1980s. [See map.] These result in many thousands of deaths and over 10,000 refugees in PNG. Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) formed gaining mass support for an independent future. Sporadic ongoing guerilla campaign commences.
18. Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) report released in April 1995 detailing killings of villagers and a priest by ABRI [Indonesian government and armed forces] soldiers in the Freeport Mine operations area. Partially in response to expansion of the mine’s concession area from 10,000 hectares to 2.5 million.
19. Seven young European scientists kidnapped on 8 January 1996 by OPM Central Command under Kelly Kwalik. Held until May 9 when rescued by Kopassus troops.
20. July 6 1998 Biak Island massacre occurs when ABRI troops attack hundreds of unarmed Morning Star flag raisers demanding independence. Reportedly 20 killed and 141 injured in original attack, some 139 others, mostly women and children taken on board Indonesian naval frigates and reportedly killed at sea, many grave atrocities reported. No independent investigation into these events.
21. February 23-25 2000 Kongres Rakyat Papua, or Congress held in Jayapura where thousands of Papuans gather to discuss future. Plans made for a Musyawarah Besar (MuBes), or ‘large consultation’ later in year. President Wahid gives A$172,000 and his support as long as independence not declared. Name changed from Irian Jaya to Papua.
22. May-June 2000 MuBes held in Jayapura and attended by some 20,000 Papuans from across the country and social spectrum. 31 member leadership Presidium elected with Chief Theys Eluay emerging as Chairman and acknowledged leader.
23. Law No 21/2001 passed on Special Autonomy for Papua Province aimed at dealing with separatists’ grievances through increased local Papuan control over society and economic resources. Opposed by many Papuans who feel that Autonomy has been forced upon them. Widespread demands for independence continue.
24. Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri takes control of West Papua ‘issue’ after widespread criticism of Wahid for encouraging separatists. Military crackdown commences with banning of Morning Star flag, arrest and harassment of Papuan leaders. Assassination of Chief Theys on 10 November 2001 by Kopassus soldiers.
25. August 31 2002 Two Americans and one Indonesian killed and eight Americans injured in attack on a school teachers picnic near Tembagapura, support town for the Freeport Mine. OPM initially blamed by Indonesian military, although TNI remains suspect. FBI investigations continuing.
26. Presidential Instruction No1/2003 on the establishment of West and Central Irian Jaya Provinces, in addition to Papua Province. This decree contradicts the previous Autonomy law and has invoked fear and uncertainty amongst Papuans.
27. December 2003 Timbul Silaen, former police chief in East Timor during the UN sponsored referendum in 1999, is appointed as the new police chief for Papua. Eurico Guterres (who worked with Salaen in East Timor) announces plans to establish a branch of his pro-integration Red and White Defender Front militia in Papua. He has been convicted of crimes against humanity but is free pending an appeal.
28. January 2004 rumors abound about the declaration of a ‘State of Emergency’ to deal with separatists. Fears of an Aceh style military operation to destabilize Papua in the context of Indonesian presidential and parliamentary elections.
29. March 4 2004 U.S. officials believe local army commanders ordered the ambush that killed two American teachers near a gold mine in a case that has held up resumption of normal US-Indonesian military ties, two American officials told The Associated Press. “It’s no longer a question of who did it…. It’s only a question of how high up this went within the chain of command”. The officals say little doubt remains about who was responsible for the attack on vehicles driving down a road to a gold mine operated by New Orleans-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold.
SOURCES: C.L.M. Penders. 2002. The West New Guinea Debacle (Crawford House/KITLV Press/U. Hawai‘i Press) [reviewed (pdf) in The Contemporary Pacific]; Jim Elmslie. 2002. Irian Jaya Under the Gun (Crawford House/U. Hawai‘i Press).
Chronology compiled by A. L. Crawford, Crawford House Publishing Aust. Pty Ltd., ABN 31 102 847 656, 14 Dryandra Drive, PO Box 50, Belair, SA5052 Australia; Tel: + 61 8 8370 3555; Fax: + 61 8 8370 3566; Email: tonycraw@bigpond.net.au
Filed under Indonesia, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, U.S.
Virtual Vietnam Archive
Students, scholars, and researchers can now access nearly 1 million pages of Vietnam War related research materials through the Virtual Vietnam Archive. This free online resource is a part of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University and currently includes the full text of more 80,000 documents, 60,000 photos and slides, hundreds of interviews with veterans and other participants (to include streaming audio and transcripts), other streaming audio and video recordings, and much more. The documents include official government and military records to include presidential office materials, unit and operation after action reports, unit rosters, staff journals and morning reports, personal letters, diaries, and many other materials. We add nearly 20,000 pages of new material online each month and expect this will increase significantly in the near future when we acquire some new digital scanning equipment. The Virtual Vietnam Archive is the most potent, dynamic, and easily accessible research tool available regarding the Vietnam War. To access these free online resources, just visit our website and select Virtual Vietnam Archive.
The Virtual Vietnam Archive is funded through the Institute of Museum and Library Services.
SOURCE: Stephen Maxner, Archivist, Associate Director, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Special Collections Library Room 108, Lubbock, TX 79409-1041; Phone: 806-742-9010; Fax: 806-742-0496; Email: steve.maxner@ttu.edu
Filed under Vietnam
Major Security Concerns in Indonesia
USINDO Open Forum
Major Security Concerns in Indonesia
Sidney Jones – Indonesia Project Director, International Crisis Group – Jakarta
February 23, 2004
Washington, DCDirector of the International Crisis Group’s office in Jakarta, Sidney Jones, spoke to an overflow crowd about three major security problems Indonesia faces: Papua, Aceh and terrorism conducted by Jemaah Islamiah. She believes the most virulent form of JI terrorism may be brought under control in the short and medium term, but predicts long term lower intensity terrorism. She is not sanguine that violence in Papua and Aceh will diminish any time soon.
Papua: Sidney Jones noted that central government plans to divide West Papua into three provinces, which had caused such a furor, had now been modified to divide the province in half. The present situation calls for a province of West Irian and a province comprised of all the rest of the area, while plans for a central province have been frozen. But there remains no less outrage among Papuans most of whom — although not all — are concerned that the division undermines promised autonomy.
There is an additional problem on the horizon: the division of the provinces into multiple sub-districts divided along ethnic lines. Each would be headed by a tribal leader, each of whom would fill the local governing bodies with unqualified loyalists. Poor governance is liable to result and as Indonesia moves towards elections, competition among districts and ethnic groups over resources will increase. There will not necessarily be destabilization, but the TNI [Indonesian Military] will be sure to exploit divisions and conflicts in order to strengthen its own control.
Another source of concern in Papua is the explosion of HIV/AIDS. Five to ten percent are now infected and the situation is being exacerbated by substantial movement among the population.
Finally there are the problems posed by the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM) with members ranging across Papua and rebels supporting them from across the border. The prospect for increased tensions in Papua is increasing.
Aceh: Martial law continues with no resumption of negotiations that might end it in sight. Nor are there any incentives for Jakarta politicians to move toward negotiations while elections are underway.
The TNI is succeeding in sharply limiting access to the province by human rights and other humanitarian workers; only a few ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] members and none of their international employees have been allowed entry. The limited access together with blanket control over the media, means too little is known about what is actually going on and it has become impossible to make accurate assessments. That said, military operations appear to have become even more aggressive as raider battalions have been added to the mix and planned reductions among existing troops have yet to take place. Casualties would seem to be increasing.
In some areas such as the cities, where more is known, the TNI is getting better marks for handling security, but there is no evidence of that in areas where aggressive action is underway. The elite Police Mobile Brigade or Brimob’s reputation remains as bad as ever. Nor is there an exit strategy, although there has been some talk of a downgrading of the situation to a civil emergency. This option holds little promise either, however, since the provincial government which would take charge is immensely corrupt and inefficient.
Hostage negotiations have been underway for some time, with the GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdeka = Free Aceh Movement] holding some 40 hostages. When one being held (Ersa Siregar, a senior reporter for RCTI [Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia]) was killed by the TNI, there was outrage among Indonesians generally that might have led to a change of approach by the central government. However, the GAM’s demands were studded with unacceptable conditions, the public turned against the GAM, and there are no prospects for release.
Nor are the TNI and the government making distinctions between GAM members and sympathizers, trials are unfair, no legal counsel is being allowed. The Acehnese negotiators arrested on their way to the Tokyo negotiations last year have been unfairly convicted of terrorism.
On top of it all, it seems the TNI is committing the same military mistakes and excesses made in the past, and it is no accident this is occurring as elections approach. Replacement troops are less well trained and equipped. GAM forces are bad also, but the TNI is worse.
Special autonomy legislation is dead as long as the TNI remains in control. No transition plan is in the works. It would seem in sum that neither the GAM nor the government have any interest in negotiating a solution, at least for now.
Jemaah Islamiah: Sidney Jones discerns separate levels of activity at work.
First there are the Bali and Marriott bombing faction of JI which was led by Hambali. Hambali and this group looked to Al Qaeda and in fact to a degree divided JI against itself as some followed the Al Qaeda crusade against the west and others stuck to JI’s original guiding purpose: creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. As the result of good police work, only about eight or ten of the leaders of this first group remain at large; there is a good chance they will be caught; and the immediate threat of another Bali type attack against western targets should recede.
The second group is comprised of the non-bombing majority of JI, with goals similar to Darul Islam and its long term plan to create an Islamic state. But the apparent major split in JI may not in fact exist and this wider group appears to have become a home for Hambali types. Members of this group are being sent to Mindanao for weapons and explosives training and some may again resort to major violence.
Darul Islam members comprise a third group and it is itself sending people to Mindanao for training. This group has its own organization and capabilities. Jones thought it fascinating that those who commit violence are recruiters for the next group and there is a linear connection between events in 1983, 1989 and events today. She believes that even if there is a split among top leaders members at lower levels retain a lot in common.
Finally the major risk today comes from locally organized groups who are carrying out local bomb attacks. The bombings in south Sulawesi are attributed to such a group.
Questions and Answers:
The United States failure to date to provide direct access to Hambali or his taped interviews has become a big issue among Indonesians who conclude that the United States sees cooperation as a one way street.
JI members are recruited from certain mosques and are winnowed down to a select few through a rigorous process. They come originally from a small number of schools and colleges. Those selected come from conservative, modernist backgrounds – not just anybody is chosen and in fact there are no known NU members. It would be difficult to stem the flow from within Muhammadiyah since the leadership is conflicted due to internal rivalries. There is no correlation with socio-economic backgrounds.
No one in JI is working for a caliphate – only for an Indonesian Islamic state. Members see JI as a religious organization. Since they do not support democracy they do not work through existing political parties.
The Bali and Marriott bombing investigations have largely dispelled the conspiracy theories that contended the west was responsible. Still batting down conspiracy theory is a constant necessity.
Given the irreconcilable differences in Aceh, Jones sees no solution until Hassan diTiro is dead and GAM’s ground commanders gain greater say. Now GAM is not interested. The government needs to consider establishment of local parties. Not much pressure to cease as in the case of Vietnam can be expected.
via the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hawai‘i
Filed under Indonesia
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